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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. EDWARD SIMON WEIN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Jury-Challenges-Voir Dire-Questions as to Death Penalty. 
-A prosecutor in a case where the death penalty may be im-
posed has the right to ascertain the views of potential jurors on 
capital punishment so that he can intelligently exercise his 
challenges against those whose consciences would preclude 
them from imposing this penalty. (Pen. Code, § 1074, subd. 8.) 
[2] !d.-Challenges-Voir Dire-Hypothetical Questions.-During 
the questioning of prospective jurors, a prosecutor may prop-
erly use his explanation of the law applicable to the case as a 
basis for hypothetical questions to determine whether the 
jurors would follow the instructions of the court and to as-
certain their state of mind on the issues to be presented. 
[3] Criminal Law-Conduct of Counsel-During Voir Dire Exami-
nation.-A prosecutor may properly inform prospective jurors 
that he represents all the people of the state, not just the 
victims or police, where he in effect does little more than state 
general theories underlying criminal prosecutions. 
[4] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of CounseL-A defendant 
who failed to object to alleged improper conduct of the prose-
cutor's examination of prospective jurors cannot complain for 
the first time on appeal, where on objection any danger that 
the jury might have misunderstood their duty could have been 
corrected by proper instructions. 
[5] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting At-
torney.-While arguments of a prosecutor should be addressed 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Jury, § 103(7); [2] Jury, § 102(4); 
[3] Criminal Law,§ 589; [4, 19] Criminal Law,§ 1092; [5] Crim-
inal Law,§ 1404; [6, 11] Criminal Law, § 632; [7] Criminal Law, 
§ 629; [8] Criminal Law, § 1098; [9, 12] Criminal Law, § 1404(12); 
[10] Criminal Law, § 1404(1); [13] Criminal Law, § 1309; [14] 
Rape, §§ 90, 92; [15] Kidnaping, §§ 1, 7; [16] Kidnaping, § 2; 
[17, 18] Criminal Law, § 453 (6); [20] Criminal Law, § 816; [21] 
Criminal Law, § 453 ( 4); [22] Criminal Law,§ 389 (3) ; [23] Criminal 
Law,§ 784; [24] Criminal Law,§ 842; [25] Criminal Law,§ 587.1; 
[26] Criminal Law,§ 836; [27] Criminal Law,§ 915; [28-31] Kid-
naping, §8; [32] Criminal Law, §686; [33, 34] Criminal Law, 
§ 1437(7); [35] Criminal Law, § 286; [36, 37] Criminal Law, 
§ 277; [38] Criminal Law,§ 1363; [39, 40] Criminal Law,§ 235(4); 
[41] Criminal Law, § 211; [42) Criminal Law, § 1475; [43, 44] 
Criminal Law, § 107; [45] Criminal Law, § 1218; [46] Criminal 
Law, § 1063. 
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to the and the practice of addressing individual 
jurors by name during argument should be condemned, such 
conduct is not necessarily prejudicial. 
[6] Id.- Argument of Counsel- Comments on Punishment.-.A 
prosecutor may properly urge his points vigorously as long 
as he does not act unfairly, and may therefore vigorously urge 
the jury to convict and to impose the death penalty in the light 
of the evidence. 
[7] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Comment on Defendant.-A prose-
cutor may use appropriate epithets warranted by the evidence, 
such as defendant was among that "strange breed" of "kid-
napers, Tobbers and foTcible rapists," without being charge-
able with pTejudicialmisconduct. 
[8] !d.-Appeal- Objections- Misconduct of Prosecuting At-
torney.-\Vhere no objection was made in the trial court to 
the conduct of the prosecuting attorney during his argument 
to the jury and no instructions were asked, claims of miscon-
duct will be rejected when the point is raised for the first time 
on appeal. 
[9] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting At-
torney.-Alleged misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was 
not a ground for Teversal where any possible harmful effect 
could have been obviated by timely admonition to the jury 
and where the evidence was not so closely balanced, presenting 
grave doubts as to defendant's guilt, that the prosecutor's 
argument materially affected the outcome. 
[10] !d.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-Though the prosecutor in a case involving a series 
of kidnapings and sex offenses might have strayed beyond the 
bounds of peTmissible argument in stating, "Why, this fellow 
puts Caryl Chessman to shame. He makes a Tank amateur out 
of Caryl Chessman," and though defendant made timely ob-
jection, but the court allowed the prosecutor to continue along 
the same lines, such alleged misconduct did not constitute 
ground for reversal where it was not claimed on the trial or 
on appeal that the peTpetrator of the several offenses should 
have had imposed on him any punishment less than that which 
the juTy imposed, and where, notwithstanding defendant's sole 
claim that he was not the perpetrator, the evidence of his guilt 
was so strong that there was no reasonable pTobability that 
any result more favorable to him would have been reached in 
the absence of the claimed misconduct. 
[11] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Comment on Punishment.-State-
ments of the prosecuting attorney both in his voir dire exami-
nation of the jury and his closing argument that a sentence 
of life imprisonment without possibility of paTole would not 
necessarily mean that defendant would Temain in prison for 
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the remainder of his life were not improper where they could 
have been taken by the jurors as factors to be considered 
the penalty. 
[12] Id.-Appeal-Rarmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings 
and sex offenses, the prosecutor's reference in his to 
the Legislature's consideration of a bill proposing a mora-
torium on the death penalty did not harm defendant where 
the prosecutor made it clear that he did not believe any mora-
torium would be adopted, and where he merely used this to 
show how changes in penalties could be sought in amplification 
of his remarks on the uncertainties of a sentence to life im-
prisonment without parole. 
[13] !d.-Appeal- Questions of Law and Fact- Authority of 
Court.-It is not the function of the Supreme Court as an 
appellate court to reweigh the evidence; though there may be 
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of not guilty, this does 
not show that a verdict of guilty was without evidentiary sup-
port. 
[14] Rape-Appeal-Review of Evidence-Improbable Testimony. 
-It was within the jury's province in a case involving a series 
of sex offenses to reject defendant's statements that as a small 
man with an injured back he would have been unable to seize 
a woman, tie her and then rape her, and to believe the testi-
mony of the various women he had abused, where they had a 
full view of his stature and the relative stature of the victims, 
and where there was nothing in the record to establish that 
it was physically impossible for defendant to have performed 
the acts ascribed to him or to compel the reviewing court to 
declare the numerous victims' testimony inherently improbable. 
[15] Kidnaping-Elements.-It is the fact, not the distance, of 
forcible removal that constitutes kidnaping; testimony of vic-
tims fixing the amounts of movement between rooms in a dwell-
ing at distances ranging from a few feet up to more than 
50 feet sufficed for a conviction of kidnaping for the purpose 
of robbery under Pen. Code, § 209, since such conduct went 
beyond mere detention. 
[16] !d.-Validity of Statute.-Pen. Code, § 209, relating to kid-
naping, is constitutional as against the objection that the lan-
guage "who kidnaps or carries away" is uncertain; while de-
fendant has a right to fair notice as to what acts are pro-
hibited, the code section contains terms well enough known to 
enable him and others to understand their import; it need not 
include detailed plans and specifications of the proscribed con-
duct. 
[15] See Cal.Jur.2d, Kidnaping, § 11. 
50 C.2d-13 
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[17] Criminal Law-Evidence-Declarations and Conduct Respect-
ing Accusations.-In a prosecution involving a series of kid-
napings and sex offenses, testimony concerning a remark made 
by one of the victims when she met defendant after seeing 
him in a jail line-up, "Well, I'm glad they caught you, kid," 
to which he made no reply, was correctly admitted to permit 
the jurors to evaluate its accusatory nature and the weight 
accorded to defendant's failure to make any reply. 
[18] Id.- Evidence- Declarations and Conduct Respecting Ac-
cusations.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings 
and sex offenses, defendant's statement to a witness who had 
seen defendant at the home of one of the victims prior to 
the attack and who later asked defendant several questions at 
the behest of police officers, that he would not answer any 
questions unless he had an attorney present was harmless 
where it might have been excluded if objection had been made. 
[19] !d.-Appeal- Objections- Conduct of CounseL-Defendant 
cannot make his first attack on the arguments of the prose-
cuting attorney with regard to admissions on appeal when any 
error could have been obviated at the trial. 
[20] Id.-Instructions-Evidence-Admissions.-The giving of in-
structions on the definition of an admission, the effect of silence 
or a false or evasive reply, and the possibility of falsehoods 
indicating consciousness of guilt was not error where evidence 
of such admissions and reactions thereto, introduced without 
objection, could be considered by the jury. 
[21] Id.- Evidence- Declarations and Conduct Respecting Ac-
cusation.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings 
and sex offenses, testimony that when a victim saw defendant 
in a public place and had him detained she said, "This is the 
man that raped and kidnaped me," defendant's reply, "That 
gal is drunk," could be considered an equivocal answer to a 
direct accusation. 
[22] !d.-Evidence-Facts Showing Consciousness of Guilt.-In a 
prosecution involving a series of kidnapings and sex offenses, 
where defendant's testimony placing him at another location 
during one of the attacks was directly contradicted by his own 
statements to police officers shortly after his arrest, the jury 
could have considered the latter statement as a false or con-
tradictory statement showing a consciousness of guilt. 
[23] !d.-Instructions-Evidence-Consciousness of Guilt.-In a 
prosecution involving a series of kidnapings and sex offenses, 
it was not error to give the standard instruction on conscious-
ness of guilt and falsehood where, though defendant's wit-
nesses testified he had spent the date of the last attack at his 
[17] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 400 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 559 et seq. 
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sister's home, he had been positively identified by the victim 
in her testimony as the person who committed the offenses in 
her home on that date, and where he told the police following 
his arrest that he had on that date been at specified places 
other than his sister's home, since the jury could properly 
infer from this evidence that defendant had procured false and 
fabricated alibi evidence with respect to the date in question. 
[24] !d.-Instructions-Failure to Produce Evidence.-In a prose-
cution involving a series of kidnapings and sex offenses, it was 
not error to give the standard instruction that neither prosecu-
tion nor defense is required to produce all available evidence, 
though defendant pointed out that the brothers and sisters of 
a 14-year-old victim who were in the house when defendant 
arrived but were not present when the criminal acts were 
perpetrated, and the escort of the last victim who was with 
her when she encountered defendant in a public place and 
had him apprehended, were not called to testify, where the 
witnesses could not have testified to any ultimate issues or 
essential elements of the crimes. 
[25] !d.-Conduct of Counsel-Duty to Call Witnesses.-There is 
no compulsion on the prosecution to call any particular witness 
so long as there is fairly presented to the court the material 
evidence bearing on the charge for which defendant is on trial. 
[26] Id.-Instructions-Witnesses-Impeachment-Contradictory 
Statements.-In a prosecution involving a series of kidnapings 
and sex offenses, it was proper to refuse defendant's general 
instruction pertaining to all witnesses and to give the standard 
instruction on contradictory statements with its clause appli-
cable when defendant is a witness, since the standard instruc-
tion covers contradictions by all witnesses and docs not place 
too great emphasis on defendant's own statements. 
(27] Id. - Instructions - Punishment.-Alleged uncertainty be-
tween two paragraphs of an instruction because the second 
did not repeat the number of the counts of the information 
in discussing them the second time could not have created any 
confusion in the minds of the jurors as to what they could 
consider in fixing penalties, where the character of the offenses 
discussed in the second paragraph was clearly mentioned and 
the various counts have been fully explained in a preceding in-
struction. 
[28] Kidnaping-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury could not 
have been confused by that portion of one instruction telling 
them not to consider the possible penalties on counts other 
than kidnaping for the purpose of robbery with bodily harm 
and the portion of another instruction telling them, "it is your 
duty to conscientiously consider all the evidence in the case 
in arriving at your decision as to the penalty to be fixed by 
you in this case," where this quotation was part of an instruc-
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""''"""tlv placed in the jury's absolute discretion the 
of the death penalty or confinement for life 
possibility of parole (Pen. Code, § 209) for kidnaping 
for the purpose of robbery with bodily harm and permitted 
the jury to take all the evidence into consideration on this 
alone. 
[29] !d.-Province of Jury-Determination of Penalty.-The 
has the right to use all of the evidence in choosing between 
the two penalties authorized for kidnaping for the purpose of 
robbery where bodily harm has been suffered by the victim, 
and is not required to set the penalty by referring only to the 
evidence introduced on the particular count. (Pen. Code, 
§ 209.) 
[30] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-That portion of an instruc-
tion that "Insofar as selecting the penalty [under Pen. Code, 
§ 209] is concerned the law does not itself prescribe, nor 
authorize the court to innovate any rule circumscribing the 
exercise of your discretion, but, rather commits the whole 
matter of its exercise to your judgment and conscience" was 
neither meaningless nor incorrect, but was merely another way 
of telling the jurors that they were charged with the final de-
termination of the penalty and that they were to act within 
their own uncircumscribcd discretion. 
[31] !d.-Instructions- Punishment.-With reference to counts 
charging kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, the court was 
correct in telling the jury that they could consider the evidence 
and possible consequences of the two penalties in determining 
the punishment defendant should receive. (Pen. Code, § 209.) 
[32] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Cautionary In-
structions.-If a cautionary instruction is not requested in 
prosecutions involving sex offenses that such accusations are 
easily made and difficult to disprove and that the testimony of 
the prosecution witnesses should be carefully examined, it is 
incumbent on the court to give one on its own motion. 
[33] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Failure to Give Cautionary 
Instructions.-Failure to give a cautionary instruction in a 
prosecution involving sex offenses was not prejudicial error 
where seven of the eight prosecuting witnesses testified with a 
high degree of certainty as to defendant's identification and 
criminal acts, where their testimony revealed a set pattern in 
which their assailant operated and to this extent their stories 
were mutually corroborative, where their narrations were com-
pletely consistent in all important respects, and where the only 
possible discrepancies that defendant was able to show was 
where a 14-year-old victim was uncertain of defendant's height. 
[34] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Failure to Give Cautionary 
Instructions.-Where it was improbable that the jury would 
have rejected the testimony of the prosecuting witnesses if a 
PEOPLE v. WEIN 
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cautionary instruction on sex offenses had failure 
to give the instruction did not result in a justice 
requiring reversal. 
[35] Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on RebuttaL-The 
practice of allowing the district attorney or his aides to with-
hold a part of their case in chief and to offer it after the 
defense has closed is ordinarily condemned, but testimony 
introduced for purposes of of defend-
ant in his denial on cross-examination of an incident not 
charged in the information may be admitted, at least where no 
objection is raised. 
[36] Id.-Order of Proof-Discretion of Court.-The order of 
proof rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. 
(Pen. Code, §§ 1093, subd. 4, 1094.) 
[37] Id.-Order of Proof-Discretion of Court.-Where the de-
sirability of admitting testimony at a questioned point in the 
trial may be debatable, no abuse of discretion on the part 
of the trial court should be found when that court did not 
have the point brought to its attention. 
[38] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Order of Proof-RebuttaL-
In a prosecution involving a series of robberies, kidnapings 
and sex offenses, expert testimony that defendant's fingerprint 
was found on a glass at the home of one of the victims may 
have been improperly received on rebuttal where the prosecu-
tion had this information two days prior to the close of its case 
in chief, but a reversal was not warranted in view of the fact 
that, to the extent that defendant might have been unfairly sur-
prised, this was obviated by the granting of his request for 
additional time to meet the testimony, and in view of the fact 
that the fingerprint merely corroborated the direct testimony 
of one of the victims. 
[39] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Jury.-The 
proper time for the examination of prospective jurors on the 
issue of insanity is during their selection at the beginning 
of the trial. 
[40] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Jury.-The 
same jury that passes on the issue of guilt can approach the 
insanity issue objectively, since it must be assumed that a fair 
and impartial jury would obey instructions and therefore hold 
in reserve their ultimate finding on the issue of defendant's 
sanity until that separate issue and the evidence supporting it 
is, in the prescribed order of the trial, committed to it for de-
termination; the same reasoning refutes any supposition that 
the jury could only believe that defendant admits guilt by 
offering the plea of insanity. 
[41] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea of Insanity.-The withdrawal 
of a plea of insanity was not "forced" on defendant but was a 
"free and voluntary" choice made by him with full advice of 
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counsel where he was present in chambers when his attorney, 
the prosecutor and the trial judge discussed the possible prej-
udicial effect of questioning prospective jurors on their atti-
tudes toward pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity, where in 
response to questions posed by his own counsel he expressed his 
desire to withdraw his insanity plea and stated that he under-
stood what had transpired, and where he was also informed 
that he could not reinstate the plea as a matter of right during 
the course of the trial. 
[42] !d.-Double Punishment.-Punishing defendant separately 
for violations of Pen. Code, § 209, relating to kidnaping, and 
for robberies and sex crimes which were essential parts of the 
kidnapings would amount to double punishment forbidden by 
Pen. Code, § 654, but would not be ground for reversal where 
defendant was subjected to validly imposed death sentences. 
[43] !d.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CounseL-The fact that de-
fendant's attorney stated that his client aeknowledged that 
the acts charged were perpetrated and only contended that 
defendant did not commit them did not indicate lack of com-
petence on the part of defendant's counsel. 
[44] !d.-Right of Accused-Aid of CounseL-The handling of the 
defense by counsel of the accused's own choice will not be de-
clared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel 
displays such a lack of diligence as to reduce the trial to a 
farce or a sham; mistakes in judgment by following the strat-
egy employed do not constitute a denial of due process. 
[45] !d.-Appeal- Record- Augmentation.-Defendant's motion 
in the Supreme Court to augment the record pursuant to Rules 
on Appeal, rule 12 (a), by including a certified copy of the 
minutes of the municipal court before which the preliminary 
examination was conducted should be denied, though that 
record was offered to show that defendant was not taken be-
fore the municipal court until nearly five days after his 
arrest, since rule 12(a) specifically provides for augmentation 
only where the record was "offered at or used on the trial or 
hearing below and [was] on file in or lodged with the superior 
court," where defendant made no showing that the minutes 
were ever used in the superior court or that they ever became 
a part of that court's records. 
[ 46] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Arraignment. Defendant cannot 
claim for the first time on appeal that he was not seasonably 
brought before a magistrate. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b) ) from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
LeRoy Dawson, Judge. Affirmed; motion to augment record, 
denied. 
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Prosecution for robbery, rape, sex perversion, kidnaping 
and kidnaping for purpose of robbery. Judgments of convic-
tion of kidnaping for purpose of robbery imposing death pen-
alty, and judgments of conviction of other offenses imposing 
imprisonment for terms prescribed by law, affirmed. 
Russell E. Parsons and Henry E. Kappler for Appellant. 
Louis I.Jicht as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Elizabeth Miller, 
Ray R. Goldie and Joe Yasaki, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Respondent. 
SPENCE J.-Defendant was charged by information with 
three counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), six counts of rape 
(Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3), six counts of sex perversion (Pen. 
Code, § 288a), two counts of kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207), 
and five counts of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen. 
Code, § 209). Defendant initially entered pleas of not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of insanity, but he withdrew the 
latter plea prior to trial. The jury found defendant guilty 
on all the counts charged in the information. They further 
found that in each count charging kidnaping for the purpose 
of robbery, the person named therein suffered bodily harm, 
and they fixed the penalty at death; and that in each count 
charging robbery, the crime was in the first degree. A motion 
for a new trial was denied. Defendant was sentenced to death 
on the five counts of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery 
done with bodily harm, and to the state prison for the term 
prescribed by law on each of the remaining counts, the last 
mentioned sentences to run consecutively. This appeal from 
the judgments of death comes before us automatically. (Pen. 
Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) Defendant's present counsel have 
been substituted for his trial counsel for the purpose of this 
appeal. 
These convictions arose out of separate attacks on eight 
different women, which attacks occurred over a period of ap-
proximately 18 months. It would serve no useful purpose to 
relate all the sordid facts surrounding the commission of the 
several offenses. The evidence concerning the last incident 
will be set forth in some detail, as it typifies the general pattern 
which ran through most of the attacks with but slight varia-
tions. 
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On October 1956, the last victim advertised some furni-
ture for sale in several newspapers circulated in the Los 
Angeles vicinity, giving her telephone number but not her 
address. She occupied a lower apartment in a house located 
in the Hollywood hills. At about noon on October 31, 1956, 
she received a telephone call from a man in response to the 
and she made an appointment for him to see 
the furniture that afternoon. The man arrived at about 2 :30 
p. m. and identified himself as the party who had called earlier 
that day. A friend of the victim was present at her apart-
ment when he arrived. He indicated that he was interested 
in beds and accompanied the victim into the bedroom to 
examine them. After seeing and discussing the furniture for 
10 to 15 minutes, the man saying that he would either 
call or return after visiting another place. The victim drove 
her friend home at about 3 :30 p. m. and returned to her apart-
ment at about 3 :45 p. m. 
About five minutes after her return, the man reappeared 
at the apartment and said that he wanted to measure one 
of the beds to see if it would fit his living quarters. After 
measuring the bed, he stated that he would like to call his 
wife and have her view the furniture. With the victim's per-
mission, he used her telephone, and after dialing a number 
and apparently getting no response, he hung up. 
The man then looked at his watch and told the victim that 
he had lost his watch stem. She sympathized with him and 
got down on the floor in the small hall just out<>ide the living 
room to help him look for it. Being unable to find the r:;tem, 
she started to get up. The man, who was then behind her, put 
his arm around her waist and told her to say nothing. She felt 
something sharp in her back and discovered that it was a 
knife. He instructed her to lie down and then tied her hands 
with copper wire. 
He then told the victim to find her billfold, and after help-
ing her up, told her that he wanted only money and that he 
would not hurt her. She could not remember exactly where 
she had last placed her billfold. With his arms around her 
and the knife in her back, he forced her against her will and 
without consent to walk with him to a desk in the living room. 
This ;vas a distance of approximately 20 to 25 feet. He opened 
the desk drawer but the billfold was not there. He told the 
victim to crawl on her kneeR through the living room to the 
bedroom, a distance of about 50 feet, and she complied out 
of fear. She told him to look in the dresser drawers. He found 
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it and the $17 or $18 it contained in 
The man then the victim to the floor and said, "Now 
I have got the money, hmv about some sex?" He then removed 
the clothing from the lower of her , exposed his 
and forced her to engage in an act of oral 
§ while he brandished a knife. 
Thereafter, he in an act 
of sexual intercourse. 
The telephone then rang and the occupants of the upstairs 
apartment started to walk around. The man said that he 
was going to leave. He made the victim lie on the floor on 
her stomach, tied her with her and shoved her under-
garments into her mouth. He then picked np a towel and 
ripped it, using the larger portion to wipe the floor, drawers 
and door knobs. He tied the other part of the towel around 
her mouth and covered her head with another towel. After 
he had left, she struggled and was able to free her hands and 
feet. She then summoned the police. 
'l'he seven other incidents reflect in varying degrees the 
same techniques and show a consistent pattern of operations 
used by the perpetrator of these crimes. In each case, either 
rentals of living quarters or sales of personal property had 
been advertised in the ne>vs:papers. In all but one, he gained 
entrance on the pretext that he was answering the advertise-
ment. He would often usc some ruse to survey the premises 
for other occ:upants, sueh as asking to wash his hands in the 
bathroom, viewing the items for sale, or making a telephone 
call. In several instances, he left after finding some impedi-
ment to his scheme, later returning at a more opportune time. 
In some, he pretended to call his wife or girl friend to have 
her join in the selection. He feigned that he had dropped a 
watch stem in six cases and a watch crystal in another. He 
grabbed the victims from behind and threatened them with 
a knife. 'I'heir hands were tied with copper wire in several 
cases, and their were bound with their own stockings. In 
many ways, the methods that he employed in forcing the 
victims to part with their money and, in most instances, to 
submit to his lustful desires were strikingly similar. Of 
course, all the similarities did not appear in every case. The 
sexual molestations varied in degree and did not occur at all 
in one case. During one attack, the assailant and another man 
were present. Neve1·theless, there can be little doubt that the 
same man committed all of the numerous crimes charged. 
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Defendant was connected with these offenses in several 
ways. Seven of the victims positively identified him as their 
assailant. The eighth said he looked like the same man. Be-
yond these identifications, there were four other phases of the 
evidence corroborating the victims. First, a man transacting 
business with one of the victims clearly identified defendant 
as the person who was with her the night before she was 
molested. Second, a ear which defendant had borrowed from 
a friend was seen parked in the driveway of the residence 
of one of the victims by hvo witnesses who recognized the 
vehicle by the lettered part of the California license plate and 
the somevvhat unique brand of tires on it. Third, defendant 
was identified as the man who answered an advertisement for 
the sale of a used kitchen range and who left a check in pay-
ment. A handwriting expert testified that defendant was the 
person who wrote the check. There was no attack involved 
in the last mentioned incident. Fourth, expert witnesses 
testified that a fragmentary fingerprint found on a water 
glass, used by the assailant at the home of one of the victims, 
was the fingerprint of defendant. 
Defendant denied that he had committed any of the offenses. 
Witnesses were called to testify to his good reputation. He 
also presented testimony indicating that he was at other loca-
tions during the time that three of the offenses had been 
committed. 
Conduct of Prosecuting Attorney During 
Voir Dire Examination 
[1] Defendant contends that the deputy district attorney 
was overly zealous in questioning the prospective jurors. He 
primarily objects to the examination of the jurors about their 
opinions on capital punishment and to the discussion of their 
responsibility for imposing the death penalty if warranted 
by the facts of the ease. However, a prosecutor in a case where 
the death penalty may be imposed clearly has the right to 
ascertain the views of the potential jurors (see People v. Hoyt, 
20 Cal.2d 306, 318 [125 P.2d 29]; People v. Rollins, 179 Cal. 
793, 795-796 [ 179 P. 209] ) so that he can intelligently exer-
cise his challenges against those whose consciences would pre-
clude them from imposing this penalty. (See Pen. Code, 
§ 1074, subd. 8; People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 573-576 [305 
P.2d1].) 
[2] Defendant also deems portions of the prosecutor's ex-
planation of the law applicable to the case to have been preju-
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dicial. However, the prosecutor properly used such explana-
tion as a basis for hypothetical questions to determine whether 
the jurors would follow the instructions of the court (Kramm 
Stockton Electric R.R. Co., 22 Cal.App. 737, 746-747 [136 
P. 523]) and to ascertain their state of mind on the issues 
to be presented. (People v. Knight, 44 Cai.App.2d 887, 891-
893 [113 P.2d 226] .) 
[3] Defendant challenges the prosecutor's to the 
effect that he represented all of the people of this state and 
not just the victims or police, as being calculated to impress 
the jurors with the importance of his position and to cause 
them to give undue weight to his actions. However, it was 
entirely proper for this public officer to inform the panel of 
his functions. In effect, he did little more than to state gen-
eral theories underlying criminal prosecutions. [4] In any 
event, since defendant failed to object to any of the alleged 
improper conduct during the deputy district attorney's exam-
ination of the veniremen, he cannot now complain for the first 
time as, upon objection, any danger that the jury might have 
misunderstood their duty could have been corrected by proper 
instructions. (People v. Brice, 49 Cal.2d 434, 437 [317 P.2d 
961] ; People v. Guasti, 110 Cal.App.2d 456, 465 [243 P.2d 
591.) 
Conduct of Prosecuting Attorney During Arguments 
Defendant raises numerous objections to the deputy district 
attorney's arguments to the jury and states that the alleged 
misconduct denied him a fair trial as guaranteed by both the 
state and federal Constitutions. He claims that the jurors 
were "whipped" into their recommendation of the death 
penalty. This, in his view, was apparently produced by the 
prosecutor calling the jurors by their names, by taking them 
to task, and by using epithets. However, his conclusions en-
tirely overstate the actual situation. It is true (1) that the 
deputy distriet attorney did refer to one or more jurors by 
name on three Reparate occasions; (2) that he did vigorously 
urge the jury throughout his arguments to impose the death 
penalty; and ( 3) that he did use ''epithets'' when he re-
ferred to defendant as being among that "strange breed" of 
"kidnapers, robbers and forcible rapists." [5] \Vith respect 
to the first point, while arguments should be addressed to 
the jury as a body and the praetice of addressing individual 
jurors by name during the argument should be condemned 
rather than approved, it does not follow that sueh eonduet 
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[6] With re-
is entitled to a 
fair trial, the prosecutor may properly urge his vig-
orously as long as he does not act ; and therefore 
he may vigorously urge the to convict and to impose 
the death in the of the evidence. (People v. 
219 Cal. 732- P.2d .) [7] And with 
ro·~n''"t to the third the prosecutor may use 
epithets which are warranted the evidence without being 
chargeable with prejudicial misconduct. v. Carr, 113 
Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [248 P.2d v. 49 
Cal.App.2d 243, 250-251 [121 P.2d v. Bnrnette, 
39 Cal.App.2d 215, 230 P.2d 799].) [8] In any event, 
no objection was made in the trial court to any of the above 
conduct or to certain other matters of which defendant now 
complains, and no instructions were asked with respect there-
to. We have consistently rejected snch claims when the point 
is raised for the first time on appeal. v. Ham.pton, 47 
Cal.2d 239, 240-241 [302 P.2d 300] ; v. Byrd, 42 Cal. 
2d 200, 208 [266 P.2d 505] .) [9] Furthermore, this is not 
a case where any possible harmful effect of the comments 
could not have been obviated by a timely admonition to the 
jury (see People v. J{irkes, 39 Cal.2d 719, 726-727 [249 P.2d 
1]) or where the evidence was so closely balanced, presenting 
grave doubt as to defendant's guilt, that the prosecutor's 
argument materially affected the outcome. (People v. Flem-
ing, 166 Cal. 357, 381 [136 P. 291, Ann. Cas. 1915B 881] .) 
[10] There was one instance during the prosecutor's argu-
ment, however, where he may have strayed beyond the bounds 
of permissible argument and where a prompt objection was 
made by defendant's counsel. The prosecutor said, in part, 
"Why, this fellow puts Caryl Chessman to shame. He makes 
a rank amateur out of Caryl Chessman." At this point, the 
defense counsel cited this as prejudicial misconduct and re-
quested that the jury be instructed to disregard it. The 
prosecutor then asserted his right under People v. ]{ynette, 15 
Cal.2d 731 [104 P.2d 794], to proceed along these lines and 
the court permitted him to do so. He then contrasted Chess-
man's attacks from an automobile disguised as a police vehicle 
operating in the relative open of the public streets with de-
fendant's assaults in the victims' homes. He then said, 
''Chessman, too, had ice water in his veins. That little girl 
[the 14-year-old victim in this ... will carry a mark 
on her forever. She may end up the same way Mary Alice 
WE!N 397 
the victim of the Chessman 
institution unless she has a strong mind 
and can in some way her thinking beat it." 
He then concluded that the death was deserved be-
cause the defendant the ". behavior pattern of 
a cold cruel individual with ice water in his veins.'' 
The attempt to the as did 
the prosecutor at the v. Kynette, 
supra. There it was said: ''Counsel may illuminate his argu-
ment illustrations which may be as various as the resources 
of his talents. He may refer to matters of common knowledge, 
not special to the case, and to well known historical incidents.'' 
Cal.2d 731, 757.) It appears, however, that the comments 
here were more similar to those criticized in People v. Jackson, 
44 Cal.2d 511 [282 P.2d 898]. There the prosecutor in a kid-
naping case referred to the Greenlease, Hart, and Lindbergh 
cases, and compared the ultimate fate of the victims. ( 44 
Cal.2d 511, 520.) But even assuming that the prosecutor here 
went beyond the bounds of legitimate argument in his com-
parison of this case with the Chessman case, it does not follow 
that a reversal is required. It was not claimed on the trial or 
on this appeal that the perpetrator of the several offenses 
should have had imposed upon him any punishment less than 
that which the jury imposed. Defendant's sole claim was that 
he was not the perpetrator. vVe have reviewed the record, and 
such review convinces us that the evidence of defendant's 
guilt was so strong that there is no reasonable probability that 
any result more favorable to defendant would have been 
reached in the absence of the claimed misconduct. Under such 
circumstances, the claimed misconduct does not constitute 
ground for a reversal. (People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 
837-838 [299 P.2d 243].) 
Argunwnt of Prosecuting Attorney as to Meaning of Life 
Imprisonment without Possibility of Parole and Legisla-
tive Abolition of Death Penalty 
[11] Defendant asserts that it was prejudicial error for 
the deputy district attorney to have stated both in his voir 
dire examination of the jury and his closing argument that a 
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
would not mean that defendant would remain in 
prison for the remainder of his life. He pointed out that any 
such sentence could be commuted by the Governor, that a 
pardon could be granted by the Governor, or that the Legisla-
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enaet a law the sentence. In People v. 
38 Cal.2d 166, 189-190 P.2d 1001 , the identi-
cal remarks, both in the argument by the prosecutor and the 
explanatory instruetions by the eourt, were sanetioned insofar 
as they were addressed to the dis<:retion of the jury in speeify-
the punishment for kidnailing for the purpose of robbery 
where the victim suffered bodil.r harm. (See also 
47 Cal.2d 112, 116-117 [301 P.2d 
43 Cal.2d 572, 580-581 [275 P.2d 25] ; v. Byrd, 
S1lpm, 42 Cal.2d 200, 206-208.) When the dE'puty district at-
torney's remarks are reatl in full, it is quite apparent that they 
eould only haYe been taken by the jurors as faetors to be con-
sidered in assessing the penalty. 'l'he ease of People v. Mor-
lock, 46 Cal.2d 141, 147-148 [292 P.2d 897], relied upon by 
defendant, is clearly distinguishable. There, the prosecutor 
erroneously stated that a person sentenced to life imprison-
ment was eligible for parole within seven years rather than 
after having sened seven years. E(pmlly unavailing is People 
v. Cartmw, 29 Cal.2rl 616, 619-620 [177 P.2d 11, sinee the only 
comments there held improper were to the effect that paroles 
might be granted without regard to merit in order to provide 
space for incoming prisoner;;;. 
[12] Defendant also maintains that the deputy district at-
torney's reference to the Ijegislature 's consideration of a bill 
proposing a moratorium on the death penalty may have 
harmed him by leading the jurors to believe that he would 
benefit from sueh a suspension. Hovvever, the deputy district 
attorney made it abundantly clear that he did not believe 
that any sueh moratorium would be adopted. He merely used 
this to show how ehanges in penalties could be sought in 
amplication of his remarks on the uncertainties of a sentence 
to life imprisonment without parole. 
Sufficiency Evidence 
[13] Defendant argues that there was ample evidenee to 
have supported a verdiet of acquittal, and he buttresses this 
eonelusion by marshali11g those facts whirh tend to show his 
innoeenee. lie tben eharac:terizcs parts of the People's ex-
pert testimony as "highly suspect." From this, he expresses 
the hE'lief that the jury might well have accepted his alibi ex-
cept for the "grossly prejudieial" eon duct of the prosecutor. 
Insofar as this again raises the question of prejudice from the 
proseentor 's actions, this has been fully considered. Insofar 
as it c-hallenges the suffieieney of the evidence, defendant is 
merely asking us to reweigh the evidenee. This is dearly not 
PEOPLE V. \VEIN 
[50 C.2d 383; 326 P.2d 457] 
399 
our fuuction as an appellate court. (See People v. Daugherty, 
40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [256 P.2d 911]; People v. Headlee, 18 Cal. 
2d 266, 267 [115 P.2d 427]; People v. 15 Cal.2d 678, 
681 [104 P.2d 778] ; People v. Tedesco, 1 Cal.2d 211, 219 [34 
P.2d 467] .) Further, even though there might have been 
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of not guilty, this in 
no way shows that the verdict of guilty was without abundant 
support. 
[14] F'inally, defendant attempts to show that some of the 
rvic1ence was so highly improbable as to be incredible and to 
thus allow an appellate court to set aside the eonviction. (See 
v. Headlee, supr·a, 18 Cal.2d 266.) He says that, as a 
small man with an injured back, he would have been unable 
to seize a woman, tie her, and then rape her. The jury only 
had defendant's own testimony as to the eondition of his 
but they did have a full view of his stature and the rela-
tive stature of the vidims. Tt was within their province tore-
his statements, as they apparently chose to do. 'I'hey 
evidently believed the testimony of the various women vvhom 
he had abused. 'l'he conflict in the evidenee was resolved by 
the triers of fact. There is nothing in the reeord to establish 
that it was physically impossible for defendant to have per-
formed the acts aseribed to him, or to compel us to declare that 
the numerous victims' testimony was inherently improbable. 
(People v. Huston. 21 Cal.2d 6!l0. 608 [134 P.2d 7581; People 
v. Wilder, 151 Cal.App.2d 698, 704-705 [312 P.2d 425] .) 
E:rfent of Movement Req11ircd to Establish Kidnaping 
Under Penal Code, Election 209 
[15] Defendant urges that the Legislature in enaeting 
seetion 209 of the Penal Code, whieh permits the imposition 
of the death penalty against ''any person ... who kidnaps 
or carries away any individual to commit robbery" if the 
vietim suffers bodily harm, intended that the movement be 
over a substantial distanee and not merely between the rooms 
in a dwelling. He expressly asks this court to reconsider the 
position it took in People v. Chessman, supra, 38 Cal.2d 166, 
190-193. There we said, "The fact that Regina in being 
kidnaped or carried away was forced to move only 22 feet 
does not make her abdmtion any the less kidnaping within 
the meaning of the statute. She was taken from the car of 
her ehosen escort, and from hiR company, to the car of defend-
ant and into the latter's company and there detained as a 
virtual prisoner and forced to submit to his demands. It is the 
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fact, not the of forcible removal whieh constitutes 
kidnaping in this state." Cal.2d 166, 192.) We there 
reviewed the California cases and those from other jurisdic-
tions where kidnapings were held to exist although the aspor-
tations were not great. the of some of the 
victims fixed the amounts of movement at distances ranging 
from a few feet up to more than 50 feet. Under the reasoning 
and language of the Chessman any oE these distances 
sufficed for a conviction under ehallenged section. This 
conduct went beyond a mere detention during the eourse of 
an armed robbery, which is no longer punishable by death. 
(See People v. 135 Cal.App.2d 201 [286 P.2d 952].) 
To the extent that defendant's argument is predieated on leg-
islative intent, it must be noted that the has been 
in session several times since the Chessman case \Vas decided, 
and it has not seen fit to amend the kidnaping law to limit the 
rule we announced. If the seetiou, as interpreted by this court, 
is regarded as too harsh, the remedy is for the Legislature to 
redefine kidnaping, and not for this court to engraft some 
uncertain distance limitation onto the plain language of the 
seetion. (See People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 180-183 [217 
P.2d 1] .) 
Constit1dionality of Penal Code, Section 209 
[16] Defendant asks that we deelare section 209 unconsti-
tutional because the language, ''who kidnaps or carries away,'' 
is uncertain. This indefiniteness is supposed to be apparent 
from the decisions of this and other California courts. How-
ever, defendant fails to cite the decisions which he believes 
produce this effect. Rather, it would seem that the previously 
quoted language from the Chessman case clearly indicates the 
broad sweep of this section. 
"While defendant concededly had a right to fair notice as 
to what acts were prohibited In re Peppers, 189 CaL 682 
[209 P. 896]; People v. Neff, 117 Cal.App.2d 772, 780-781 
[257 P.2d 47] ), it appears that the questioned statute con-
tained terms well enough kno>vn to enable defendant and 
others to understand their import. (See Lorenson v. Snperior 
Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 59-61 [216 P.2d 859]; People v. Deibert, 
117 Cal.App.2d 410, 417-420 P.2d 355]; People v. Darby, 
114 Cal.App.2d 412, 427-428 P.2d 743] .) The statute 
did not have to include "detailed plans and specifieations" 
of the proscribed conduct. (Lorenson v. Superior Court, 
S1lpra, 35 Cal.2d 49, 60.) 
curred when a 
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admissions. One of the vietims testified that 
one of the victims to an 
several at the behest of the 
cers. Defendant cast his eyes toward the floor and saw that 
he would not answer any unless he had an attorney 
Defendant contends that these ineidents could not 
be construed as any type ol' and that the 
error in admitting them \Yas the deputy 
district attorney's comments and the court's instructions. 
\Vhile the testimony the first ineident involving 
the remarks of a victim was admitted in order to 
the jurors to evaluate nature and the 
\Veig·ht to be aceorded to defendant's failure to make any reply 
People v. Smith, 111 Cal.App. 580-581 P. ), 
the second one, where defendant remained silent on the as-
serted ground that he would not unless he had an attor-
ney present, might well have been exc·luded if objeetion had 
been made. (See People v. Abbott, 47 Ca1.2d 373 [303 
P.2d 730] ; People v. McGee, 31 Cal.2d 288-240 P.2d 
706].) Howewr, defendant's to this line of testi-
mony is made for the first time on this appeaL Such belated 
attempts to obtain reversals have been held ineffective in 
regard to testimony relating to admissions v. 
Guarino, 132 Ca1.App.2d 554, 559 [282 P.2d ; People v. 
Cummings, 7 Cal.App.2d 406, 407 [46 P.2d 778]) and in 
regard to admitting hearsay evidenee (People v. Wade, 138 
Cal.App.2d 5:31, 53:3 [292 P.2d 303]; Prople v. Jlfnrray, 135 
Cal.App.2d 600, 602 P .2d ) . 'I' he rule should apply 
with equal forre to testimony relating to alleged adoptive 
admissions. [19] Also, defendant cannot as he at-
tempts here, his first attaek on the arguments of the deputy 
district attorney witb regard to admissions on appeal, when 
any error could have be0n obviated at the trial. ( S0e People 
v. Brice, supra, 49 Cal.2d 434, 4:37; People v. Hampton, 
supra, 47 Cal.2d 239, 240-241 [302 P.2d 300].) [20] More-
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over, the giving of instructions on the definition of an admis-
sion, the effect of silence or a false or evasive reply, and the 
possibility of falsehoods indicating consciousness of guilt (see 
Cal. Jury Instrns., Crim. (1946 and Supp. 1953) Nos. 29, 
29-D, 30, 30-A) was not error since the evidence introduced 
without objection could be considered by the jury. (See 
People v. W acle, S7tpm, 138 Cal.App.2d 531, 533; People v. 
Murray, supra, 135 Cal.App.2d 600, 603.) [21] Further, 
although not raised by the deputy distriet attorney before the 
jury, there were other ineidents in the record, admitted with-
out objection, whieh fell within these instructions. When the 
last vietim saw defendant in a public place and had him de-
tained, she said, ''This is the Inan that raped and kidnaped 
me.'' Defendant made ·what might well be considered an 
equivocal answer to the direct accusation when he replied, 
"That gal is drunk." [22] Also, defendant's testimony 
placing him at another location during one of the attacks was 
directly contradicted by his own statements made to the in-
vestigating police officers shortly after his arrest. The jury 
could have eonsidered the latter statement as a false or eon-
tradictory statement showing consciousness of guilt. 
Instructions 
Defendant assails certain instructions given to the jury and 
challenges the trial court's refusal to utilize some of the 
instructions offered by him. [23] First, he complains that 
the standard instruction on consciousness of guilt and false-
hood (Cal. Jury Instrns., Crim. (1946) No. 30-A) should not 
have been read because part of it pertains to situations where 
a defendant has "endeavored to procure false or fabricated 
evidence to be produced at the trial.'' Defendant's witnesses 
testified that he had spent the day of October 31, 1956, being 
the date of the last attack, at his sister's home. On the other 
hand, defendant had been positively identified by the victim 
in her testimony as the person who committed the offenses in 
her home on that date. Furthermore, defendant had told the 
police following his arrest that he had been at specified places, 
other than his sister's home, on the date in question. The jury 
could properly infer from this evidence that defendant had, 
in fact, procured false and fabricated alibi evidence with 
respect to October 31, 1956. There was therefore no error in 
giving the challenged instruction. 
[24] Second, defendant maintains that while the standard 
instruction to the effect that neither the prosecution nor de-
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fense is required to produce all available evidence (CaL ,Jury 
Instrns., Crim. (1946) No. 23) correctly stateB the law gen-
erally, thiB case comes within a recognized exception. De-
fendant relies on Peop7e v. Beal, 116 Cal.App.2d 475, 479 
[254 P.2d 100], where the court in a case involving the rape 
of a 13-year-old girl stated that, since the prosecution failed 
to produce the examining physician as a witness, it was to be 
"presumed that his testimony ·would not be corroborative of 
that given by the complaining witness.'' Here, defendant 
points out that the brothers and sisters of the 14-year-old 
victim, who were in the house when defendant arrived but 
were not present when the eriminal acts were perpetrated, 
and the eseort of the last victim, who was with her vYhen she 
encountered defendant in a public place and had him appre-
hended, \Vere not called to testify. However, the Beal case is 
readily distinguishable. There, the testimony wonld have 
been highly material. The rape vietim was examined by a 
physician the morning after the attack but the physician was 
not offered as a ·witness. Here, the witnesses could not have 
testified to any ultimate issues or essential elements of the 
crimes charged. Further, the reversal in the Beal case did 
not turn directly on the failure to call the physician. The 
court found that certain statements of the prosecuting attor-
ney were highly improper. To show how this misconduct was 
prejudicial, the court looked to the even balance of the evi-
dence. It was in this context that it stated the presumption. 
(116 Cal.App.2d 475, 477-479.) [25] Instead, People v. 
Tuthill, 31 Cal.2d 92, 102 [187 P.2d 16], would seem to be 
controlling. There \Ye said, ''There is no compulsion on the 
prosecution to call any particular witness ... so long as 
there is fairly presented to the court the material evidence 
bearing upon the charge for which the defendant is on trial." 
( 31 Cal.2d 92, 98.) This rule applies to the instant ease, and 
shows that there was no error in giving the challenged in-
structions, which substantially reiterated the rule announced 
in the Tuthill case. 
[26] Third, defendant contends that by using the standard 
instruction on contradictory statements with its clause appli-
cable when a defendant is a witness (Cal. Jury Instrns., Crim. 
(1946 and Supp. 1953) No. 54-A-alternate), the court unduly 
emphasized any contradictions made by defendant. He says 
that a general instruction should have been given pertaining 
to all witnesses, since one of the victims made conflicting 
statements about her assailant's height. However, defendant 
0.2d 
instruction to be when 
the defendant has not contradicted himself. (CaL Jury 
The difference is in 
which correctly 
statements ean be 
show the truth of such state-
39 CaL2d 585 
instruction covers contradictions 
witnesses and does not too emphasis on 
defendant statements. The court refused de-
fendant's own more since the applicable 
law had been covered. 36 Cal.2d 
234, 240 P.2d 17] ; 30 Ca1.2d 676, 688 
[185 P.2d 1] .) 
[27] Fourth, defendant interposes several objections to in-
structions on what the jurors could consider in fixing the 
penalties. He attempts to show uncertainty between two 
paragraphs of one instruction because the second did not re-
peat the number of the counts of the information in discussing 
them the second time. However, this could not have created 
any confusion in the minds of the because the character 
of the offenses discussed in the second paragraph was clearly 
mentioned and the various counts had been fully explained 
in one of the preceding instructions. 
[28] Defendant also tries to show a conflict between two 
portions of the instructions which he believes could have only 
led to on the part of the jurors. He ini-
tially refers to the paragraph the jury not to consider 
the possible on those counts other than kidnaping 
for the purpose of robbery with bodily harm. He then 
contrasts a small fragment of another instruction telling the 
jurors, ''. . . it is yonr duty to conscientiously consider all 
the evidence in the ease in arriving at your decision as to 
the penalty to be fixed by you in this case." However, de-
fendant has taken the latter quotation out of the context of 
the instruction given by the court on the penalty for kid-
for the purpose of robbery where bodily harm has 
been suffered the victim. It correctly and clearly placed 
in the absolute discretion the imposition of either the 
death penalty or confinement for life without possibility of 
parole Code, § 209) and permitted the jury to take all 
the evidence into consideration on this inquiry alone. These 
full instructions could not have confused the jury. 
on the basis of ''. . . 
the evidence. . . . '' 
also v. 
Al~o, dden(lant claims 
the instruction about the 
405 
see 
nuder section 209 was 
the is concerned 
nor authorize the court to 
innovate any rule the exercise of your dis. 
hut, rather commits the wlwle matt<'r of: its E'xercise 
to your judgm0nt and conseienre." This portion of the in-
struction was nE'itl1er meaningless nor incorrect. People 
v. Friend, snpra, 47 Cal.2d 767.) It was hut another 
way of telling the jurors that they were charged with the 
final determination of the penalty, and that they were to act 
within their own uncireumscribcd cliseretlon. 
[31] Fifth, defendant to the instruction rovrring 
the manner in which the in its delibera-
tions on those counts for the purpose of 
robbery. He extracts two says that they were 
a misstatement of the law. However, the court was correct 
in telling the that could consider the evidence and 
the possible consequences of the two in determining 
the punishment defendant should receive. (See 
Brust, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 776, 789-700, n. 4-; 
supra, 47 Cal.2d 767, 768.) The instruction as a whole 
presented an accurate summation of the process to be used in 
fixing the penalty fol' the Yio1ations of section 209. 
Sixth, defendant contends that the iJF;truetions on the 
clements necessary to ronstitute a violation of: section 209 
were improper. the i nstrnetions were correctly 
based upon the statute and the rules enunciatrd in People 
v. Chessman, su~pra, 38 Ca1.2d 192. Also, defendant says 
406 PEOPLE V. W EIN [50 C.2d 
that there was a mere detention involved here, and that the 
instructions on kidnaping under section 209 were inapplicable. 
However, there was far more than a mere detention here 
as hereinabove indicated. 
[32] Seventh, defendant urges that the court erred in 
failing to give a cautionary instruction to the effect that, in 
prosecutions for sex offenses, accusations are easily made and 
difficult to disprove, and that the testimony of the prosecuting 
witnesses should be 0arefully examined. Even if such an 
instruction is not requested, as here, it is incumbent upon 
the court to give one on its own motion. (People v. Nye, 
38 Cal.2d 34, 40 [237 P.2d 1]; People v. Willis, 129 Cal.App. 
2d 330, 336 [276 P.2d 853] .) [33] However, it is not always 
prejudicial error for the court to fail to give the instruction, 
since the circumstances of each case are the determinative 
factor. (People v. Nye, supra, p. 40; People v. Willis, supra, 
p. 337.) Here, seven of the eight prosecuting witnesses 
testified with a high degree of certainty as to defendant's 
identification and criminal acts. 'fheir testimony revealed a 
set pattern in which their assailant operated. To this extent 
their stories were mutually corroborative. On the whole, their 
narrations were completely consistent in all important re-
pects. The only possible discrepancy that defendant is able 
to show was where the 14-year-old victim was uncertain of 
defendant's height. Further, other substantial evidence con-
nected defendant with the crimes. [34] As was said in 
People v. N ye, supra, page 41: ''A careful examination of 
the entire record in accord with artide VI, section 41/z of 
the California Constitution, leads us to the conclusion that 
it is improbable that the jury would have rejected the testi-
mony of the prosecuting witnesses had a cautionary instruc-
tion been given and that there has therefore been no mis-
carriage of justice requiring reversal of the judgment.'' 
Admission of Evidence on Rebuttal 
[35] Defendant makes two objections to evidence pre-
sented by the prosecution on rebuttal. First, he claims that 
a woman witness, who was not attacked, should not have 
been allowed to testify that defendant answered her news-
paper advertisement offering an electric range for sale. She 
identified a check as having been given to her by defendant 
under an assumed name. Later, a handwriting expert ex-
pressed his opinion that the check was written by de-
fendant. This chain of evidence was produced on rebuttal 
after defendant had denied on cross-examination all the es-
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sential facts of the incident. The practice of allowing the 
district attorney or his aides to withhold a part of their case 
in chief and to offer it after the defense has closed has been 
condemned in People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 753-754 [312 
P.2d 665], and People v. Rodriquez, 58 Cal.App.2d 415, 418-
419 [136 P.2d 626]. But here the testimony was clearly 
introduced primarily for purposes of impeachment of de-
fendant in his denial on cross~examination of an incident not 
charged in the information. In any event, no objection was 
made to the introduction of this evidence. [36] Further, the 
order of proof rests largely in the souJJd discretion of the 
trial court. (Pen. Code, §§ 1093, subd. 4, 1094; People v. 
Byt·d, supra, 42 Cal.2d 200, 211-212; People v. Avery, 35 
Cal.2d 487, 491 [218 P.2d 527].) [37] Where, as here, the 
desirability of admitting- the testimony at the questioned point 
may be debatable, no abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial court should be found when that court has not had the 
point brought to its attention. (See People v. Carter, supra, 
48 Cal.2d 737, 754.) 
[38] Second, defendant claims that the expert testimony 
that defendant's fingerprint was found on a glass at the 
home of one of the victims should not have been received on 
rebuttal. 'l'he prosecution had this information two days 
prior to the close of its case in chief. Again we come to the 
question whether the district attorney or his aides indulged 
in a proscribed withholding of matter properly belonging 
in their case in chief. (People v. Carter, supra, 48 Cal.2d 
737, 753-754; People v. Rodriqttez, stlpra, 58 Cal.App.2d 415, 
418-419.) An affirmative answer seems possible. However, 
under the facts of this case, a reversal is not warranted. To 
the extent that defendant may have been unfairly surprised, 
this was obviated by the granting of his request for addi-
tional time to meet this testimony. The fingerprint was prob-
ably not unduly magnified in significance, since it merely 
corroborated the direct testimony of one of the victims. It 
was not as crucial as the defendant's confession withheld 
in People v. Rodriq1tez, supra, or the defendant's apparel 
found near where the murder weapon was abandoned and 
withheld in People v. Carter, supra, a case resting entirely 
on circumstantial evidence. In short, it cannot be said that 
any claimed error in admitting this testimony on rebuttal 
warrants a reversal. (See People v. Byrd, supm, 42 Cal.2d 
200, 212; People v. Avery, supra, 35 Cal.2d 487, 491.) 
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Trials on Issne 
district attorney, 
while chambers with the trial the defendant, and 
announced his intention to question the 
reason 
to have a separate 
that defendant -would be 
nation. The 
that the 
attitudE's toward pleas of not 
Defendant claimed the right 
the issue and urged 
such voir dire exami-
this was the only time 
Defendant then with-
drew his of not guilty r0ason of insanity. Defendant 
contends that he was forced to make this eleetion because 
the if so questioned, could only have gained the im-
pression that he was guilty. He sees a denial of due process 
and of a fair trial because a defendant is required, in the dis-
cretion of the court, to submit the issue of insanity to the 
same jury whieh passed on the question of guilt (Pen. Code, 
§§ 1016, 1026) and which might not be impartial. 
[39] However, it has long been held that the proper time 
for the examination of the prospective jurors on the issue of 
insanity is during their s0lection at the beginning of the 
trial. (People v. Woods, 19 Cal.App.2d 556. 558 [65 P.2d 
940]; People v. Foster, 3 Cal.App.2d 35. 39 [39 P.2d 271]; 
People V, Davis, 94 Cal.App. 192, 197 [270 P. 715].) 
[ 40] 'With regard to his assertion that the same jury could 
not approaeh the insanity issue objrctively, the following 
language employed by this eourt in People v. Leong Fook, 
20G CaL G4, 78 [273 P. 779], is significant: "We must 
assume that a fair and impartial jury of intelligent men 
and women would obey . . . r their J instructions and would 
therefore hold in reserve their ultimate finding upon the 
issue of the defendant's sanity until that separate issue and 
the evid0nce supporting it had, in the presrrihed or(1er of 
the trial, been committed to it for determination. We are 
not to assume that such a jury will eease to be fair and im-
partial as the cause progresses upon its surcessive issues, but, 
on the contrary, we must assume, in the absence of any other 
showing, that the jury has retained its attitude of fairness 
and impartiality under the changed proe0dure as before until 
the whole cause ... has been determined." This answers de-
fendant's basic that he would not have received an 
impartial trial on the insanity issue. Also, the same reasoning 
equally refutes defendant's supposition that the jury could 
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the plea of 
due process 
l1ave not been advanced before, it is 
to note that sections 1016 and 1026 of the Penal 
been held constitutional despite many similar 
v. Da1tgherty, supra, 40 Cal.2d 876, 
therein cited.) 
cannot say that the withdrawal of the in-
was "forced" upon defendant or that he was not 
advised of the consequences of his decision. He 
present in chambers >v1wn his the 
and the trial discussed the possible prejudicial effect 
the challenged voir dit·e examination. In response to ques-
posed his own counsel, he expressed his desire to 
withdraw his insanity plea and stated that he understood 
what had transpired. He was also informed that he could 
not reinstate the plea as a matter of right during the course 
of the trial. He might well have been additionally advised 
on other matters sueh as the nonbinding effect of the reports 
the court-appointed alienists, defendant's right to examine 
these experts and to produce his own >vitnesses to controvert 
their reports, and the jury's power to make an independent 
determination. However, defendant was represented by coun-
sel who initially entered this plea over his client's objections. 
Surely, he must have explained to defendant the reasons for 
his actions. 'l'hey must have weighed the probabilities of 
success on this defense in the light of the unanimous opinions 
of the three alienists to the effect that he was sane. Defendant 
and his counsel evidently deeided that his cause would be 
better served by avoiding what they conceived to be the 
harmful effects of the proposed examination of the prospec-
tive jurors than by actually pursuing the insanity plea. This 
was a "free and voluntary" choice made by defendant with 
full advice of counf;cl. (See People v. Mendez, 27 Cal.2d 20, 
22 [161 P.2d 929] .) 
Donble Punishment 
[ 42] Defendnnt asserts that he suffered double punishment 
since he was sentenced for the kidnaping for the purpose of 
robbery and also for the robbery. Hovvever, it is not necessary 
to give extended consideration to this question. As '.Ve said 
in People v. Chessman, s11pra, 38 Ca1.2d 166, 193: "Defendant 
is correct in his eontention that punishing him separately for 
the violations of section 209 of the Penal Code (kidnaping) 
and for the robberies and sex erimes which, under the cir-
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cumstances here, are essential parts of those violations, would 
amount to double punishment, which is forbidden by section 
654 of the Penal Code. [Citing cases.] However, since de-
fendant is subject to two [here five] validly imposed death 
sentences, no purpose would be served by reversal of other 
judgments of conviction. [Citing cases.] " 
Adequacy of Defendant's Representation by Counsel 
[43] The only entirely new point raised in the amicus 
curiae brief concerns the adequacy of the representation af-
forded defendant by the attorney whom he selected to conduct 
his defense in the trial court. Two aspects of his trial counsel's 
actions are specified as showing his lack of competence : His 
handling of the voir dire examination and his failure to object 
to some of the prosecutor's conduct. His courteous deport-
ment toward the deputy district attorney is said to have pre-
vented him from protecting defendant's rights. In handling 
the voir dire examination, he is said to have persistently em-
phasized that the prosecution's witnesses were all honest and 
positive in their identifications, and that the burden of proof 
was cast upon defendant to show his innocence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Actually, he primarily stated that his client 
acknowledged that the acts were perpetrated and only con-
tended that he did not commit them. His remarks could not 
possibly have had the untoward impact upon the jury at-
tributed to them. 
[44] But even if we concede that defendant's attorney may 
not have used the best of strategy in handling the voir dire 
examination and in failing to challenge some of the prosecu-
tor's remarks, defendant still has not made that type of show-
ing which alone would compel us to conclude that he was 
deprived of due process within the meaning of the constitu-
tional guarantees. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The 
handling of the defense by counsel of the accused's own choice 
will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases 
where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and com-
petence as to reduce the trial to a ''farce or a sham.'' ( Lunce 
v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110; see also Taylor v. 
United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414, cert. denied, 
353 U.S. 938 [77 S.Ct. 817, 1 L.Ed.2d 761); United States ex 
rel. Feeley v. Ragen [7th Cir.], 166 F.2d 976, 980-981; Hend-
rickson v. Overlade [N.D. Ind.], 131 F. Supp. 561, 562-564.) 
The record in this case does not even remotely approach such 
a situation. Defendant's sole defense lay in his claim that his 
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identification by the victims was ineorreet. His counsel vig-
cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses to test their 
and assiduously attempted to establish an alibi and 
to show defendant's good character. He at most committed 
what in retrospect may be claimed to he mistakes in judgment 
following certain strategy employed. Such mistakes, if 
do not constitute a denial of due process. (United States 
rel. Darcy v. IIandy [3d Cir.], 203 F.2d 407, 426, cert. 
denied sub nom. Maroney v. United States ex rel. Darcy, 346 
U.S. 865 [74 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed. 375] .) 
Motion to Augment Record 
[45] Defendant moves to augment the record pursuant to 
rule 12 (a) of the Rules on .Appeal by inc I uding a certified 
copy of the minutes of the municipal court before which the 
preliminary examination was conducted. That record is 
offered to show that defendant was not taken before the mu-
nicipal court until nearly five days after his arrest. He 
claims that there was "unnecessary delay" (Pen. Code, § 849) 
and that his constitutional rights were thus violated, citing 
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 [77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed. 
2d 1479]. However, rule 12 on which defendant relies, by 
its own terms, provides for augmentation only where the 
record was "offered at or used on the trial or hearing below 
and [was] on file in or lodged with the superior court." 
(Rules on .Appeal, rule 12(a).) Here, defendant makes no 
sho·wing that the minutes were ever used in the proceedings 
in the superior court or that they ever became a part of that 
court's records. (See Estate of Hobart, 82 Cal..App.2d 502, 
510 [187 P.2d 105].) [46] Further, it would serve no use-
ful purpose to add the requested document to the record since 
defendant cannot claim for the first time on appeal, as he 
attempts here, that he was not seasonably brought before a 
magistrate. (People v. Newell, 192 Cal. 659, 669 [221 P. 
622] ; People v. Tennyson, 127 Cal..App.2d 243, 246 [273 P.2d 
593] .) The motion must therefore be denied. 
In conclusion, it should be stated that the voluminons record 
and briefs have been carefully examined because of the seri-
ousness of the charges made against defendant and because of 
the nature of the penalty that has been imposed upon him. 
Such examination leads us to the conclusion that the evidence 
overwhelmingly showed that he was guilty of the long series 
of despicable crimes with which he was charged. We further 
conclude that defendant was accorded a fair trial, and that 
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there were no errors or other 
which would warrant a reversal. 
The motion to augment the record is denied. The judgments 
and the order denying a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. Shenk, Traynor, and 
McComb, concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent on four grounds: 
(1) The majority has misconstrued the meaning of the word 
"kidnaps" as it is used in Penal Code, section 209; 
The term "carries away" is so ambiguous within the 
context of section 209 as to be meaningless; 
(3) The misconduct of the prosecutor in his summation was 
prejudicial to defendant in the matter of the sentence deter-
mined by the jury ; 
( 4) The majority has affirmed the infliction of a penalty so 
excessive in relation to the defendant's acts as to transgress 
the constitutional provision condemning punishments which 
are cruel or unusual. (CaL Const., art. I, § 6.) 
The jury found the defendant had done these acts: 
(1) He sei11ed M. M. and tied her hands behind her with 
wire. He held a knife in her back while she searched for her 
billfold. Then he ordered her to crawl through her house to 
the bedroom. 'rhere he robbed her of $17 or $18, raped her, 
and forced her to an act of fellation. He forced her to move 
altogether about 75 feet under duress. 
(2) He seized L. S. and bound her hands with wire. He 
dragged her by the hair 3 or 4 feet into a bedroom, then threw 
her 2 or 3 feet onto the bed. He raped her, forced her to an 
act of fellation and cut her with his knife. He then dragged 
her into a second bedroom an unstated distance away and 
locked her in a closet. He stole $200 in cash and a $4,000 
money order. 
(3) He seized C. F. in her bedroom and bound her hands 
with wire. He asked her for her money.· She said she had 
$10 in the kitchen but he did not look for it. He did not 
take the $1.00 he found in her billfold. Then, to quote the 
victim, ''. . . he helped me up on the bed.'' The distance >vas 
4 or 5 feet. He then raped her and forced her into per-
version. 
( 4) He seized L. B. in her bedroom and bound her hands 
with wire. He took valuable jewelry and $30 to $40 in cash. 
He forced her to walk back about 12 feet to a daybed, and, 
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of discomfort. he told her to up and 
her or feet to a ehair. Then he raped her. 
liP seized and bonnd the hands of F. II. in her living 
He sai<l he was going to rob her and she "'Here 
I go ahead and take it.' " She wore 
ano her purse was on a sofa in the same room. But 
He her !o the floor 5 feet away in 
renter of tlw room and foreed her into 
these acts defendant was eonvieted on three eounts of 
degTee robbery (Pen. § 211a), four counts of rape 
261, subd. 3), fonr counts of sex pc•rversion (Pen. 
, and five eonnts of kidnaping- with intent to 
rob and causing bodily harm (Pen. Codr, § 209).* 'l'he penalty 
first degree robbery is not less than five years in the state 
; for rape it is not less than three years in the state 
; for perversion it is not more than 15 years in state 
or not more thau one year in the county jaiL The 
was for the term presc·ribrd by law, the terms to run 
The penalty for kidnaping with intent to rob 
where hodily harm is done to the victim is life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole or deaih. The ehoice is dis-
with the jury. The jury decided that Wein 
should die. 
The jury also found that defendant did these acts: 
( 6) He seized and bound K. S., aged J 5, shoved her 2 feet 
nto a bedroom, raped her and violated Penal Code, section 
288a. Afterwards she walked 8 feet at his eomrnand. 
) He seized and severdy beat A. C. He moved her 13 feet 
into a closet and fled. 
( 8) He and an accomplice seized A. H. and "dragged her 
'JH ';\ny person 'vho seizes, confines, inveigles~ entices, decoys, abducts, 
kidnaps} or rarries away any individunl hy any Ineans whatso~ 
ever intent to hold or drtain or who holds or detainR, such individual 
for ransom, rrward or to commit P:-dortion or to exact from relatives or 
friends of such person any money or valuahle thing, or nny person who 
or cnrrics nway any individual to connnit rohhcry, or any person 
who or nhets an.'' Sllrh aet, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction 
thereof shall su ffor c1cnth or sk1ll lw punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for life without of pnrok. at the discretion of the 
trying the same, in cases in the person or subjected to 
kidnaping suffers or suft'n l"um or punished by im, 
prisonnwnt in the state prison for with of parole in cases 
wl1ere such r>crson or do not suffer harm. 
" n seni<'nce of imprisonment for life ·without 
a convidion mHler this section as it read 
prior to this aet Rhall be eligible for a release on 
as if he had been R0ntcmcecl to imprisonment for life with possi-
of parole.'' (Pen. Code, 9 209.) 
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out onto the floor," a distance of about 3 feet. Defendant 
raped her and committed the perverse act. 
Por these acts defendant was convicted on two counts of 
rape, two counts of sex perversion, and two counts of kidnap-
as defined by Penal Code, section 207.* 
Assuming the was correct in its factual finding;;;, the 
defendant is guilty of the most perverse and outrageous crimes 
and should be punished and with little mercy. 
However, it is my condusion that the defendant did not 
violate Penal Code, sections 209 or 207, and, assuming 
arguendo that he did, the penalty of death is excessive to the 
point of barbarity. 
THERE vVAs No VIOLATION OF PENAL ConE SECTIONS 209 OR 207 
Since 1901 there haYe been two kinds of kidnaping in Califor-
nia. Section 207 was enacted in 1872 and codified the common-
law definition. 'rhe flection originally required that the victim 
be carried across a county or state line to constitute kid-
naping. In 1905 the Legislature inserted the words '' ... or 
into another part of the same county ... '' making it possible to 
kidnap a victim without crossing a county line. (Stats. 1905, 
chap. 493, p. 653.) 
'fhe Legislature enacted section 209 in 1901. It then pro-
vided: "Every person who maliciously, forcibly, or fraudu-
lently takes or entices away any person with intent to restrain 
such person and thereby to commit extortion or robbery, or 
exact from the relatives or friends of such person any money 
or valuable thing, is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished 
therefor by imprisonment in the state's prison for life, or any 
number of years not less than ten." 
There was no usc of the word "kidnaping" in the enacting 
legislation (Stats. 1901, chap. 83, p. 98, § 1). This section 
*"Every person who forcibly steals, takes, or arrests any person in 
this state, and carries him into another country, state, or county, or into 
another part of the same county, or who forcibly takes or arrests any 
person, with a design to take him out of this state, without having estab-
lished a claim, according to the laws of the United States, or of this etate, 
or who hires, persuades, entices, decoys, or seduces by false promises, 
misrepresentations, or the like, any person to go out of this state, or to be 
taken or removed therefrom for the purpose and with the intent to sell 
such person into slavery or involuntary servitude, or otherwise to employ 
!lim for his own use, or to tho use of another, without the free-will and 
consent of such persuaded person; and every person who, being out of 
this state, abducts or takes by force or fraud any person contrary to 
the law of the place where such act is committed, and brings, sends, or 
conveys such person within the limits of this state, and is afterwards 
found within the limits thereof, is guilty of kidnaping." (Pen. Code, 
~ 207.) 
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was not meant to redefine kidnaping. The word first appears 
in Deering's Penal Code, 1906 edition, in the heading of the 
section. The Legislature first referred to violations of section 
209 as kidnaping in 1933 in the descriptive heading to an 
amendment to that section (Stats. 1933, chap. 685, p. 1757). 
These headings are not enacted into law. That amendment 
read: ''Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, 
decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any indi-
vidual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain, 
or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom, reward 
or to commit extortion or robbery or to exact from relatives 
or friends of such person any money or valuable thing, or 
who aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a felony and upon 
conviction thereof shall be punished by life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole in cases in which the person or 
persons subjected to such kidnaping suffers or suffer bodily 
harm inflicted by such kidnapers; or by life imprisonment 
with possibility of parole in cases where there is no violence 
and upon the recommendation of the trial jury or in the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.'' 
'l'he verb "kidnaps" was included in the definition of the 
crime defined by section 209. It cannot be assumed the Leg-
islature meant to define the section 209 crime by itself by 
using this word. The word must be construed to have a 
meaning apart from and narrower than the erime defined by 
section 209. There are two possibilities: (1) It meant com-
mon law kidnaping; or (2) it meant kidnaping as defined in 
section 207. Since the Legislature had already rejected the 
common-law definition of kidnaping and redefined it, the 
clear implication is that the word "kidnaps" in section 209 
means kidnaping as defined in section 207. This is the conten-
tion of the attorney general in his brief in this case. 
Section 209 was interpreted from 1933 to 1951 to eneompass 
the act of robbery (for example, People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 
175 [217 P.2d 1]; People v. Brown, 29 Cal.2d 555 [176 P.2d 
929]). This permitted prosecutors to demand the death 
sentence sucressfully for second degree robbery in cases where 
accompanying crimes outraged the jury. In 1951, the Legis-
lature amended section 209 to its present form. (Stats. 1951, 
chap. 1749, p. 4167.) (See Pen. Code, § 209, quoted on 
page 345 of this opinion.) The 1951 amendment declared that 
section 209 was violated to commit robbery only where the 
perpetrator "kidnaps or carries away" his victim. These 
facts point to the conclusion that defendant in this case is 
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not either 
a victim as defined by section 207 or '' earricd her away.'' 
under section 207. Before 1905 Penal Code, 
section 207, required the victim to be carried outside the 
before there was a kidnaping. In Ex parte ]{eil, 85 
Cal. 309 [24 P. 742), defendants forcPd two victims from their 
boat in San Pedro harbor and took them under duress to 
Santa Catalina Island. Defendants were held not of 
kidnaping because both the island and San Pedro arc in Los 
Angeles According to the code commissioner's notes 
cited in \Vest's A.nnotated Penal Code, sections 1-260, page 
622, the 1905 amendment was advisable because of the Kcil 
decision. No other reason is advanced for the amendment 
than to remove the Keil aberration. This history of section 
207 implies that the r~egislature was still contemplating kid-
naping in terms of movements over considerable distances. 
_.]le words themselves clearly imply this. If the amendment 
were intended to include movements of three feet the Legisla-
ture would have amended the section by using words desig-
nating such minute movements. This is what it did in 1933 
when it added such words as ''seize'' and ''confine'' to section 
209. Significantly, it did not alter the section 207 definition 
of kidnaping at the 1938 session. It meant only to make more 
inclusive the false imprisonment of persons for extortion, ran-
som, and robbery, and therefore amended section 209 only. 
It is also significant that when the Legislature amended section 
207 in 1905 it did not alter or abolish section 286 which 
defines the crime of false imprisonment as "the unlawful vio-
lation of the personal liberty of another." It appears that 
section 236 was aimed to punish violations of liberty not gross 
enough to be described as a carrying into another part of the 
same county. 
Almost all of the California cases which review convictions 
under section 207 concerned asportations over considerable 
distances, usually many miles. All of them involved greater 
distanees than arc represented by the kidnaping of which 
\Vein was convicted. None of them involved asportations 
entirely within one enclosed plaee. In all of them the asporta-
tion was from a plaee where the intended aneillary crime was 
difficult of consummation to a place where it was more easily 
done. 'l'his was not so in \Vein. 
Three cases affirmed convictions under section 207 in which 
the asportation was not great. In none of them was the issue 
of distance discussed by the court. All of them were decided 
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v. , which 
associated the term ' ·with the short-haul abduc-
tion in that ease. Tanner was convicted undrr section 209. 
In v. lhtntcr, 49 Cal.App.2d 243 [121 P.2d 529] 
, defendant one victim 60 and another 
a railroad track to a of ties to rape them. In 
v. Cook, 18 CaLApp.2d 625 [64 P.2d (1937), 
defendant grabbed his victim as she walked in front of his 
house and dragged her inside to rape her. In People v. 
133 Cal.App.2d 4 P.2d , defendants 
fm·eed their victim into tbeir c-ar and drove him about one and 
one-balf blocks to rob him. The court relied on People v. 
38 Cal.2d 166 [238 P.2d 1001], for this holding. 
A consideration of People v. Tanner, supra, 3 Cal.2d 279, 
and People v. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.2d 175, is important 
at this point. Both were decided on the basis of the 1933 
amendment to section 209. In defendants seized 
several members of a household and forced them to move about 
the house for some hours. In defendants foreed two 
store clerks to walk to a storeroom and one of them to return 
to the front of the store, then return to the rear. An exami-
nation of the language in these eases reveals that neither Mr. 
Justice Seawell in Tanner nor Mr. Justice Traynor in 
Knowles relied on the terms "kidnaps or carries away" to 
deseribe defendants' acts. In Tanner Mr. Justice Seawell 
makes it clear that section 209 is not the same crime as kid-
naping in section 207. At page 293 he says, r('garding the 
1901 act: "It will be noted that the forcible taking of any per-
son with intent to eommit extortion or robbery, the exact 
offense of which the defendants were convicted, is made a 
felony. The only change made by the amendments of 1933 
[adding inter alia "kidnaps or earries away"] so far as they 
affect the instant case was to increaqe the penalty if the pet'son 
forcibly tak('n suffers bodily harm.'' (Emphasis added_) This 
means that defendants could have been convicted under the 
1901 act before the words "kidnaps or carries away" were 
added. 
Defendants in Tanner attacked the great departure section 
209 made from the common-law definition of kidnaping. At 
page 296 1\fr. Justice Seawell says: "No reason had been 
given why it is not within the purview of the sovereign power 
of the state to pronounce or classify as an act of kidnaping 
(following closely the language of the statute), the act of 
50 C.2d-14 
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seizing and confining a person by any means whatever . ... " 
(Emphasis that of the court.) The Tanner case therefore 
does not bear on the meaning of kidnaping as defined by sec-
tion 207. 
The Knowles decision is even clearer in its reliance on terms 
other than "kidnaps or carries away." Mr. Justice Traynor 
cites Tanner at page 184: "On appeal from their conviction 
under section 209, they [Tanner et al.J contended that their 
offense was only armed robbery and that the Legislature did 
not intend to punish it under a kidnapping statute. The 
court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Legislature is 
empowered to define criminal offenses as it sees fit and that 
the statute clearly indicates an intention to punish standstill 
kidnapping under its provisions. It is suggested that under 
the statute there must be movement of the victim, under a 
preconceived plan for protracted detention to obtain property 
that would not be available in the course of ordinary armed 
robbery. Defendant seeks to read into the statute a condition 
that the victim be moved a substantial distance. The statute 
itself is a refutation of that contention. Movement of the 
victim is only one of several methods by which the statutory 
offense may be committed. The statute provides that 'Every 
person who seizes, confines ... or who holds or detains [any] 
individual ... to commit extortion or robbery ... is guilty of 
a felony.' " (Emphasis added.) 
These cases left the terms "kidnaps" and "carries away" 
nnconstrued within the context of section 209. In determin-
ing the movement necessary to constitute a violation of section 
209, all cases relied on Tanner or Knowles. 
After the 1951 amendment here under consideration, this 
court held in People v. Chessman, 38 CaL2d 166 (see p. 192) 
[238 P.2d 1001] that defendant's act of transporting a victim 
22 feet was within the compass of "kidnaping or carrying 
away" in section 209. The majority did not analyze the mean-
ing of the terms in that opinion but rather relied on these 
authorities: 
( 1) People v. Ra1who, 8 Cal.App.2d 655 [ 47 P.2d 1108]. 
This case was decided in 1935 under the broad 1933 amend-
ment to section 209 and the court cited Tanner as its authority 
that there is no distance requirement under section 209. 
(2) People v. Cook, 18 Cal.App.2d 625 [64 P.2d 449], 
decided in 1937, raised no issue of distance. 
(3) People v. Melendrez, 25 Cal.App.2d 490 [77 P.2d 870J, 
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within the confines of section 209 before 
v. 70 Cal.App.2d 628 [161 P.2d 475], 
dec:idrd in 1945, involved a defendant who carrird a child an 
unstated distance to the roof of an apartment from a point 
the neighborhood. The issue of distance was not raised. 
v. 81 Cal.App.2d 709 [184 P.2d 953] 
) , in which defendants forced a woman into their car, 
her from Compton to 'l'orrance, and forced her into a 
house. 
(6) Cox v. State, 203 Ind. 544 [177 N.E. 898, 181 N.E. 
determined an asportation of 90 feet was sufficient under 
statute not similar to Penal Code, seetion 207. Asportation 
" ' any place within this state' " was made punishable 
( § 2426, Burns 1929 Supp.). Thic; patently refers to shorter 
distances than the terms "into another part of the same 
county" in section 207. The Indiana statute relates the 
taking to the plaee where the taking· begins; section 207 refers 
the place where it ends. 
(7) State v. Taylor, 70 N.D. 201 [293 N.W. 219], held a 
short-hanl asportation to be within a kidnaping- statnte sub-
stantially similar to section 209, in that it employs the words 
"seized, confines, inveigles, or kidnaps" to describe the crime. 
The term ''kidnap" is not elsewhere deseribed in North Da-
kota statutes. This case cites People v. Melendrez, supra, 25 
Cal.App.2d 490, as authority for its own holding. 
Therefore only two of these cases, Cook and possibly Shields, 
furnish authority for the proposition that short-haul asporta-
tion satisfies section 207. And the issue of whether or not 
the asportations were sufficient under the section was never 
before the courts. 
It is therefore my opinion that this court should reexamine 
its construction of the word "kidnaps" as used in section 
209 and define it as it was meant to be defined by section 207. 
Another consideration ignored by the majority is this: The 
patent intent of the Legislature in amending seetion 209 in 
1951 was to remove simple robbt~ry from the bounds of section 
209. Previously, simple robbery invariably constituted short-
haul kidnapiug (see "Robbery Becomes Kidnaping," 3 Stan-
ford L. Rev. 156, a note on People v. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal. 
2d 175). 'l'his legislative intent was followed by Mr. Justice 
Vallee in reversing a eonYietion in People v. Taylor, 135 Cal. 
App.2d 201 [286 P.2d 952]. The case which stimulated the 
r~egislature to action was People V. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.2d 
420 PEOPLE V. W EIN [50 C.2d 
175. It is to note that victims were forced to move 
in that case and this constituted short-haul kidnaping. In 
v. 38 Cal.2d 166 p. 192) [238 P.2d 
1001], this court held the Knowles problem was not solved 
the 1951 amendment. As a result of Chessman and the 
instant while is not per se a violation of 
section if the robber mows his victim one inch he is 
subject to the death This br describrd 
as giving force to the act. 
Lastly, if it is possible without doing violence to its words, 
a statute is to be construed to have a con,titutional applica-
tion. The majority have construed it to provide the death 
penalty for de minimis. This is within the eompass of cruel 
and unusual punishment and such a construction should be 
avoided. Section 4 of the Penal Code directs the courts to 
construe its provisions according to the fair import of their 
terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice. 
I conclude that defendant has not been guilty of kidnaping 
within the purview of either section 207 or section 209 and 
the convictions and judgments thereof must be reversed and 
the counts of the information alleging them stricken. 
THE PHRASE "CARRIEs AwAY" Is AMBIGuous 
Even if defendant <lid not "kidnap" his victims, he would 
still be guilty of violating section 209 if he "carried away" 
any one of them. We must therefore scrutinize the phrase 
"carries away" in section 209. 
If we were to say that to "carry away" meant no more 
than to cause a victim to move one foot we should necessarily 
include the more rigidly defined term ''kidnap,'' since any 
act constituting "kidnaping" would also constitute "carry-
ing away." This would make "kidnaps" redundant in section 
209. "To carry away" must therefore differ from "to kid-
nap'' in some way other than in the distance required to con-
summate the crime. But the statutes and cases of California 
establish no clue as to the acts which deserve this label. The 
brief of the attorney general does not attempt to assist us. 
Penal Code, section 7, subdivision 16, states: "\Vords and 
phrases must be construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language; but technical words and 
phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar 
and appropriate meaning in law, must be construed according 
to such peculiar and apprOJ1riate meaning .... " 
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines "carry away" 
PEOPLE 
r~mov~ from life 
th~ mind; to 
delude; as. to be carried au•ny 
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\V ebst~r: "1. On 
way; onward; 2. From a ; hener; then(·e ;---of 
motion: as, go away; ... 4. a Frot'l eontaet or elos~ a;-;soeia-
tion; aside; off ... 5. From one's ;-with a s~nse of 
or loss; as, to one's heart away . ... " 
J\Ieaning 2. of away, "F'rom a pla(·e" ma~· be relevant. 
the term "place" is une1ear sinee it may be used in 
such context>: as '' 'l'o move away from the '' or ''to 
move away from home.'' Its meaning as to distanre is en-
contextual. To it a meaning outside a contoxt, as 
Legislature has attempted to do, is meaninglrss. "Away" 
us to answer the quory "front whaU" 
Blackstone says that lan•eny roquired a ''carrying away.'' 
Blackstone, p. 2440.) rrhis element was satisfied by 
the slightest movement of the item to be taken. 'I'he essence 
of this common law crime was disturbance of possession and 
the movement of the property had to be accompanied by an 
intent to terminate the possession permanently. To rip a 
from a finely woven context would make a crude patch-
work of the statute. The disturbance of possession of per-
sonalty bears little resemblance to the depriYation of human 
freedom. 'l'hcy are different :social menaces and terms used 
to describe them necessarily tind thrmselves in dissimilar 
contexts playing semantical trieks on the unwary. I condude 
that the technical meaning of "earric'S away" is relevant only 
to the context of personal property law and has uo commonly 
recognized tedmical application to the realm of crimes against 
The vernacular usage of the term may provide help. Sup-
pose one says, "X carried Y away." What image arises in 
the mind of the hearer: Certainly not a picture of X foreing 
Y to move about a few feet in his own home. Or suppose 
one wished to deseribe X's foreing Y to move from one room 
to another. Many descriptive words and phrases come to mind 
before ''X carried Y away.'' For example, ''X forced Y to 
422 PEOPLE WEIN C.2d 
move against his wilL" The word "away" just does not fit 
the facts. If the Legislature intended to include all forced 
movements within its definition of section 209 kidnaping for 
robbery, a simpler and clearer term would have been used. 
'rhis is particularly true in view of the consternation raised 
by the decision in People v. Knowles, supra. The allusion to 
the command of Penal section 4, is also here. 
It is apparent that the 1951 amendment was enacted to 
assuage the mischief of the Knowles holding. In this context, 
this intent should not be construed into oblivion. And it 
certainly does not promote justice to hold that the movement 
of a person four feet is an offense sufficient to warrant the 
death penalty when the statute is open to another less strict 
interpretation. 
I conclude that the phrase "carries away," as used in sec-
tion 209, is undefined and meaningless; and that to hold that 
it encompasses defendant's acts is to misconstrue it violently. 
THE PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEPU'£Y 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
While the weight of the evidence is so massive against the 
defendant that I cannot say the prejudicial misconduct of the 
deputy district attorney was instrumental in the jury's find-
ing defendant guilty, I am of the opinion that this misconduct 
was probably a major influence in the jury's decision to fix 
the penalty at death. In other words, this misconduct preju-
diced defendant's chances to receive a life sentence rather 
than death: 
(1) He identified defendant with Caryl Chessman and re-
minded the jury repeatedly that unless defendant were exe-
cuted he might be released to commit other sex crimes. He 
stated that Chessman had been paroled before committing the 
more publicized crimes of which he was accused. 'l'his must 
have carried considerable weight in the jury's consideration 
of the penalty. Yet, defendant and not Chessman was on 
trial, and defendant was entitled to have his case determined 
on the record of his own trial. 
(2) The inflammatory ephithets used to describe defendant 
mnst have had an emotional effect on the minds of the jurors. 
Powerful words, portraying the images and associations they 
conjure, participate actively in forming human judgments. 
In a trial as emotionally conceived as this one was, they are 
particularly decisive. No objection or admonition could cure 
this psychological onslaught: Once spoken, the emotional im-
pact of the words was locked in the minds of its hearers. The 
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cited the majority to justify requiring an objection, 
involve the failure to object to evidence. An admonition to 
certain testimony in reaching a factual conclusion in a 
manner may be effective. But it is far harder to blot 
an emotion or a vivid image from the mind of a juror. 
this case I do not think it would have been possible. 
has been truly said: "You can't unring a bell." 
PENAIJTIES INFLICTED IN Turs CAsE CoNSTITUTE PuNISH-
MENTS WHICH ARE CRUEL OR UNUSUAL 
Consider the acts for which this court is affirming 
death penalty. Defendant seized and bound the hands of 
li"'. She told him where her money was but he took none. 
He helped her onto a b0d 4 or 5 fc0t away and forced 
her to perform sex acts. He was clearly guilty of rape and 
perversion. The penalty for rape is not less than three years 
in the state prison. For perven:ion it is not more than 15 
years in the state prison or less than one year in the county 
These were brutal and revolting acts. But for moving 
F. 4 or 5 feet, "helping" her to the bed, he is to be 
executed. But for this movement he would not lwve received 
the death penalty! The case involving U. H. is similar except 
that he did not rape her. Defendant committed the same 
atrocities on A. H. as he did on C. F. and in fact did more 
harm to her than to U. H. But in attacking A. H. he merely 
threw her to the floor and raped her and committed per-
version. But his penalty for this was not death, but two prison 
terms! Why? Because he did not move her the necessary 
one 1:nch nor incidentally ask for her money! Of the con-
demned movements one must ask: What difference did they 
make? The answer: None. 
The above comparisons reflect the absurd position into 
which this court has backed by following the Tanner, Knowles 
and Chessman cases to the consistent but irrational ultimate. 
Holmes' epigrammatic "A page of history is worth a volume 
of logic" has found its supreme justification. 
In each of the other three situations involving the death 
penalty, if the victim had not been moved a few feet there 
would be no death penalty possible. Under the rule of this 
ease a robber wl10 shows his victim against a wall is eligible 
for the gas chamber if a prosecutor arbitrarily chooses to ask 
for that penalty. Essentially section 209 may be used by a 
zralous prosecutor to kill one who has committed other more 
soeially condemned crimes which carry less severe penalties. 
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The instant case is the The deputy district attor-
ney prosecuting \Vein did tl1is In his summation he 
demanded the death penalty not for defendant's moving his 
victims but for the sexual assaults he made upon them. He 
cited the law which inflicts the death penalty for 
:rape. He belabored the leeherous acts allegedly done to 
L. then said: "If this is not treatment which earns this 
defemhmt the extreme of I never ;;aw any. 
There is not a :red blooded man on this jury, there isn't a 
woman on this jury who in my opinion would say 
otherwise.'' His only reference to the movement of L. S. 
was: ''He moves her; that is kidnapping for the purpose 
of robbery, as I explained it to you here .... " He also said: 
"I have only one regret in arguing this ease to you, and that 
is that under the law of this state, for the reason that the 
defendant did not announce as his purpose robbery at any 
time to K. S., that I cannot charge him with kidnapping for 
the purpose of robbery with bodily harm and ask you to 
return a sixth verdiet of death.'' 
I conclude that the defendant is in effect, being condemned 
to death for de minimis acts. Were the case before me, I 
should also say imprisonment for life or a long term of years 
would also fall within the seope of cruel or unusual punish-
ment. 
This court properly refuses to "draw lines" delineating 
what distanee is sufficient to constitute kidnaping. It is the 
task of the Legislature. The Legislature attempted by its 
1951 amendment to do this and failed to communicate its 
intent to this court. 'rhe court has chosen to label all short-
haul asportations "kidnaping." The holding in this ease 
that an asportation of four feet is sufficient to send a man to 
the gas ehamber illustrates in unshaded tones that all short-
haul asportations must be declared without sections 207 and 
209 or not punished by the courts. 
This does not mean that no violation of section 207 or 
section 209 should be punished in the degree determined by 
the Legislature. It means that the penalties assessed in this 
pa1·ticular case are too severe beeause the statute, as con-
strued by the majority, iR overly broad. \<Vhile preeise lines 
must be drawn by the Legislature, the penalties assessed for 
the alleged offrnses in this case are blatantly on the forbidden 
side of it. 'l'he judiciary may not abdicate its responsibility to 
eondemn a violation of eonstitutional powers with a question-
begging eliche about separation of powers. 
eems 
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"\Vc disclaim the right to assert a judgment against that 
the Legislature of the of the law~ or the right 
oppose the power to the power to define 
and fix their punishment, unless that power encounters 
exercise a constitutional In such case not 
discretion but our legal duty, strietly defined and irnpera-
in its dircetion, is involvccL 'l'hen the power 
brought to the judgment of a power supc•rior to it for the 
instant .... They have no limitation, we repeat, but consti-
intioiml ones, and ·what those are tlw jmlieiary must .indge.'' 
.Mr. Chief Justice ·warren deseribed clearly the problem of 
definition: "This Court has had little occasion to give precise 
content to the Eighth Amendment, ancl in an enlightened 
democracy such as ours, this is not surprising.'' (Trap v. 
Dulles, 26 Law Week 4219 at 4223.) 
The eases faeing this problem of definition may be divided 
into four groups: 
(1) Those in whieh the penalty was found not exeessive in 
relation to the offense; 
(2) 'l'hose in whieh the court held the Lrg·islature free to 
prescribe Pven outrageous penalties; 
'fhosc holding the phrase ''cruel and unusual punish-
ment' refers only to uneivilized forms of puuislnuent sn<Ch 
as quartering; 
'I'hose holding punishment dearly disproportionate to 
the offense to be unc-onstitutionally cruel, unusual, or both. 
The problem in California is simpler than that faced by 
the federal courts, since our guarantee is stated disjunctively: 
''Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exeessive fines im-
posed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted." 
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 6.) 
I believe the most persuasive authority supports my judg-
nwnt that clearly exee»sive punishnwnts arc unconstitutionaL 
The defendant in Weems v. Fnitecl States, S1tpra, 217 U.S. 
349, reeeived a statutorily mandatory sentence of 12 years at 
hard labor in irons plus the permanent loss of many civil 
rights for falsifying two entries in an offieial cash book. Mr. 
Justice McKenna says of this sentence at page 377: 
"It is cruel in its cxeess of imprisonment and that which 
accompanirs and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its 
character. Its punishments come under the condemnation 
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of the bills of account of their degree and 
kind." 
Chief Justice ·warren continued in Trop v. Dulles, supra, 26 
Law \Veek 4219 at 4223, concerning the Vveems decision: 
"The Court recognized in that case that the words of the 
Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not 
static. The amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." 
In O'Neil v Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 [12 S.Ct. 693, 36 L.Ed. 
450], the court held the Eighth Amendment does not inhibit 
state action. The defendant was sentenced to 54 years in 
prison for sales of liquor during a single day. Justices Field, 
Harlan and Brewer dissented on the ground that the Four-
teenth Amendment gave the Eighth Amendment protection 
against the states. They agreed that the inhumane sentence 
in this case contravened the Eighth Amendment. 
Two compelling reasons for condemning excessive sentences 
are stated in Cox v. State, 203 Ind. 544 [177 N.E. 898, 181 
N.E. 469, at 471]. The court quotes United States v. Bar-
romeo, 23 Philippine 279 at 289: 
"A contrary view leads to the astounding result that it is 
impossible to impose a cruel and unusual punishment so long 
as none of the old and discarded modes of punishment are 
used; and that there is no restriction upon the power of the 
legislative department, for example, to prescribe the death 
penalty by hanging for a misdemeanor, and that the courts 
would be compelled to impose the penalty. Yet such a punish-
ment for such a crime would be considered extremely cruel and 
unusual by all right-minded people." 
At page 472 the Indiana court in Co.:c v. State, 203 Ind. 
544 [177 N.E. 898, 181 N.E. 469], suggests that the reason 
the issue of a punishment's cruelty and unusualness is not 
often before the appellate courts is that juries are so consti-
tuted as to find persons innocent when the punishment for 
an alleged offense offends their sense of justice. Obviously 
this element could not sway the jury so to favor a defendant 
whose sex crimes cried for vengeance. 
The finest exposition of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
excessiveness is State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450 [104 P. 596, 42 
L.R.A.N.S. 601]. Defendant was sentenced to five years in 
the state prison and fined $576,853.74 for embezzling $288,-
426.87 in state funds. He was to be imprisoned in the county 
jail until the fine was paid, but not longer than 288,426 days 
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790 years. The court revrrsed the sentence 
imprisonment for nonpayment of the fine on the ground 
it was cruel and unusual punishment. 
There is language in California eases upholding 
. Ea: J(ar1so11, JGO Cal. 378, at 88:3 [117 P. 
, said the danger that persons for 
c-ontempt were prot<,cted against exeessivc restraint the 
,•onstitutional rule enwl or unusual 
In In re Finley, 1 CaLApp. 198 [81 P. , the court re-
argument;;; that excessive sentences were not unconsti-
but held thr death penalty for an assault by a life 
eonYict was justified. 'rhc eourt said at pages 201-202: 
ii It i;;; only when the punishment is OUt of all T\Y'C>nfYP'tl 
offense, and is beyond question an 
crime of onrinary amvit y cornmdt ed under ordinary cir-
that courts may denounce it as unusual." 
Contra this position is In re O'Shea, 11 CaLApp. 5G8 [105 
77G], which contains a dictum, at page that only 
punishments of a barbarous clmraetcr, like quartering, are 
(Tuel and unusual. (The court used the c-onjunctive.) 
'rhere is language in People v. Tatmer, supra, 3 Ca1.2d 279, 
298, which may he read to mean that the death penalty for 
hidnaping is not 0xcessive. But it is insufficient to paste a 
label to an act and justify enormities by it. This illustrates 
the profundity of the insight: "\Vhat's in a name?'' It is 
tantamount to playing categories with human life. Moving 
person four feet does not justify taking life no matter what 
v1·ord,; describe the act. 
Other cases vvhieh uphold the proposition that excessiveness 
is fatal to a sentence are: Application of Cannon, 203 Ore. 
629 [281 P.2d 233] (life imprisonment for assault to commit 
rape held cruel and unusual) ; State v. Devore, 225 Iowa 815 
[281 N.W. 740, 118 A.I1.R 1104] (impri~onment until fine 
paid held cruel and unusual); Wi7liams v. State, 125 Ark. 269 
fl88 S.\V. 826] (sentence to solitary eonfinPmrnt for a misde-
mranor held cruel and unusual) ; Slate v. 1Fhitaker·, 48 I.1a. 
Ann. 527 [19 So. 457, 35 L.RA. 5Gl] (sentence of six years 
for destroying plants held cruel and unusual) ; State v. 
78 Kenan's N.C. Hepts. 3GG .C.) (imprisonment in 
eonnty jail for five years and reeogni~ance of $500 to keep 
the peaee for fiye ~-pars thcre::J ftcr for assault and battery 
held cruel and unusual); Sinclair· v. State, 161 Miss. 142 [132 
So. !581 at 582, 74 A.L.R 241] jnstires' conenrring opin-
ion said sentcneing an insane person to life imprisonment is 
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cruel and unusual); Sterle 140 Minn. 112 [167 N.\V. 
345, 347, 1 A.T-i.R. 331] (a term excessive 
would be cruel and unusual); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 
173 Mass. 322 [53 N.E. 73 Am.St.Rcp. (impris-
onment may be so long as to be cruel and unusual). 
I conelude that the death inf1icted on this defend-
ant for moving five victims from four to 75 feet (:annot stand 
in the face of the eonstltntional ma1Hlatc that cruel or mnumal 
punishment may not be infiicH:d. The must there-
fore be reversed. The acts of moving K. S. 10 feet and A. C. 
13 feet are serious enough to warrant punishment. The mini-
mum punishment prescribed for these acts, one year in the 
state prison, may not be excessive for them. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 25, 
1958. Carter, .T., \vas of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[Crim. No. 6209. In Bank. May 28, 1958.] 
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[1] Criminal Law-Instructions-Limitation of Evidence to Par-
ticular Purpose.-In the absence of a request the trial court 
was not required to instruct the jury that hearsay testimony 
given in rebuttal was admissible solely for the purpose of im-
peaching witnesses appearing for the accused. (Disapproving 
People v. G1·imcs~. 148 Cal.App.2d 747, 307 P.2d 932; People v. 
Bentley, 131 Cal.App.2d 687, 281 P.2d 1.) 
[2] Id.- Appeal- Presumptions-Instructions.-Where some of 
the prosecutor's statements might be construed that hearsay 
evidence was received not only for purposes of impeachment 
but also as proof of the charge against defendant but no 
objection was made, a reviewing court must assume that, if 
defendant had objected, the trial court would have informed 
the jury that the hearsay evidence was to be considered solely 
for purposes of impeachment. 
See Am.Jur., 'rrial, § 670. 
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